The Reporter Who lost the War: An In-depth Look at Walter Cronkite's Report on the Tet Offensive and
its Long-Term Effects
By Raegan Hoyer with Faculty Sponsor Philip Catton

Actual Events of the Tet Offensive:
In January 1968, at the start of the Tet holiday (Vietnam’s lunar
new year), the Vietnamese Communists launched coordinated
surprise attacks on American military installations, small
villages, and five major South Vietnamese cities, including
Saigon and Hue. The estimated number of Vietnamese
Communist casualties is 32,459, not 100,000. The ratio of
Vietnamese Communists casualties to Allied American and
South Vietnamese casualties ended up being 9.6:1.

The Claim:
“They [the Vietnamese Communists] lost over
100,000 of their troops, killed in the Tet Offensive
in 1968. And Walter Cronkite turned that into a
defeat for the United States.... That’s how history
turned. History turned because it was redefined by
liberal media people and has since then been
redefined by historians.” - Congressman Steve King,
2008.
Conclusion:
Steve King's claim reflects the psyche of a lot of
Americans, who earnestly believe that Walter
Cronkite gave an untruthful report of the Tet
Offensive, declared it a loss for the Allies, and then
turned public opinion against the Vietnam war.
This claim is false. We see that Cronkite never
declared it a loss, and that his report was quite
accurate. Further, we have objective data collected
from Gallup polls that show the report did not turn
the public against US involvement in Vietnam, as
public opposition had steadily increased ever since
troops had been deployed in 1965.

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Wal
ter-Cronkite
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Visual of the Gallup Poll Data

How Did His Report Shape Public Opinion?
Thanks to Gallup Polls, we can track how the opinion of the
American public changed over time. The polls show that
the number of people who believed the war was a mistake
had been steadily growing since the troops were deployed
in Vietnam in 1965. When graphed, we see that this rate
does not change following Cronkite's report in 1968. Unlike
Steve King's assertion, objective data demonstrates that
Cronkite’s report did not turn the public's opinion against
the United States. With "Hawks" being those
who approved of the war and "Doves" those opposed it,
we can make a visual representation of this data.

Cronkite’s Report:
Cronkite's Report featured interviews with
American soldiers. Some mentioned they were
discouraged by the events, one stating that the
Vietnamese Communists had worsened South
Vietnam’s refugee problem and damaged its
economy. However, it was clear from the report
that the Vietnamese Communists had taken
massive casualties, leading one general to state
that the Vietnamese Communists would not be
able to last long before needing to switch tactics.
At the end of his report, Cronkite states, “We
would like to sum up our findings in Vietnam, an
analysis that must be speculative, personal,
subjective. Who won and who lost in the great Tet
Offensive against the cities? I am not sure. The
Viet Cong did not win by a knockout but neither
did we... To say that we are mired in stalemate
seems the only realistic if unsatisfactory
conclusion”. He never stated it was a loss, he only
stated that there were no clear victors, which
was reflected by the soldiers he interviewed.

How Accurate Was The Report?
In recent years, we have been able to access the
journals and plans from the masterminds behind
the Tet Offensive, General Van Tien Dung and
Communist Party Secretary, Le Duan. They state
that their short-term goal was to, “shatter the
morale of the puppet army”. Their long-term goal
was to use the attack as a platform to “carry out
the general offensive–general uprising to
overthrow the reactionary government in South
Vietnam”. The attack was not successful enough
to complete their long-term goal, but it did prove
that they were capable of launching an effective,
large-scale attack, their biggest at that point.
This demonstrated that the time America had
spent in Vietnam was ineffective, as it was no
closer to victory. Therefore, Cronkite’s description
of the situation as a "mired stalemate" is
reasonable. There was no clear-cut winner at the
time.

